THE ESSENTIAL HOLDING OF CASEY: RETHINKING VIABILITY
Randy Beck*

“[L]egislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary
without the necessity of offering a justification. But courts
may not. We must justify the lines we draw.”
-Opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter (1992) 1
“You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the
first trimester is critical. This is arbitrary, but perhaps any
other selected point, such as quickening or viability, is
equally arbitrary.”
-Justice Blackmun, Internal Supreme Court Memo (1972)2
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a threeJustice plurality of the Supreme Court sought to achieve a lasting
resolution of the abortion controversy.3 Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and
Souter authored a joint opinion that recognized a broader scope for state
regulatory authority, while reaffirming a right to abortion in the “early
stages” of pregnancy.4 As the Court’s next significant abortion decision
demonstrated, however, the three Justices who formed the Casey plurality
had not successfully resolved the abortion issue even among themselves.
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the proper interpretation of Casey became a matter
of controversy, leading Justice Kennedy to dissent, while Justices
O’Connor and Souter joined in striking down Nebraska’s ban on partialbirth abortions.5
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Perhaps it is not surprising that the plurality opinion in Casey, which has
been understood to express the holding of the case,6 would be interpreted
in different ways by its joint authors. It is common for people to agree on
language with legal significance, but to later disagree over its application
in particular circumstances. Parties to a contract litigate its interpretation.
Legislators who vote for the same statute dispute its implications. James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton both participated in the Constitutional
Convention and collaborated in writing the Federalist Papers, but
afterwards became leaders of competing schools of constitutional
interpretation.7 The authors of the joint opinion in Casey join a long
tradition of reaching consensus on a legal formula while understanding the
formula in different ways.
This paper proposes a reading of the plurality opinion in Casey. The
suggested interpretation turns on a recognition that the core holding of
Casey was its reaffirmation of a right to an abortion early in pregnancy.8
Statements in Casey indicating that the abortion right extends to the point
of fetal viability were dicta, irrelevant to the Court’s resolution of the
issues presented.9 This article contends that the Court’s identification of
viability as the earliest point at which states can proscribe abortion has
never been adequately justified, is not supported by Casey’s stare decisis
analysis, and interferes with the pursuit of legitimate state interests.
In the interest of full disclosure, let me confess that I have not been a fan
of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence. On both constitutional and
moral grounds, my preference would be for the Court to return the
abortion issue to the political process, where it can be resolved based on
the convictions of the American people. But this article is written for those
who do not agree with me on that point. It addresses those who believe the
Constitution should be interpreted to safeguard a right to an abortion, but
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who are open to the possibility that the Court has been overzealous in
protecting abortion rights, particularly in cases like Stenberg.
Section I of the article will discuss the joint opinion in Casey, contending
that the plurality’s statements of adherence to the viability standard
constituted non-binding dicta, unnecessary to a decision on the questions
raised.10 The regulations at issue in Casey applied to all abortions, without
regard to the stage of pregnancy. Section II contends that Casey’s stare
decisis analysis does not support retention of the viability rule.11
Assuming that some women have relied on the availability of abortion in
organizing their personal and professional lives, as the Casey plurality
believed, that reliance cannot reasonably encompass the viability line. The
sorts of career and family planning decisions the Casey joint opinion
emphasized do not depend on a right to abortion that continues well over
halfway through pregnancy.
Together, sections I and II of the article suggest that the Court should feel
free to rethink the significance of fetal viability, even if it chooses to retain
Casey’s “undue burden” formulation. Excising the dicta about viability,
one can understand Casey to protect a right to terminate a pregnancy in the
“early stages.”12 Fetal viability need play no role in such an analysis.
The sections that follow make a case for rejecting viability as a legally
significant line. Section III of the article contends that the Court has never
adequately justified extension of abortion rights to the point of fetal
viability, a remarkably late stage in pregnancy when compared to abortion
laws in other countries.13 As Professor John Hart Ely noted in discussing
Roe v. Wade’s14 initial adoption of the viability standard: “Exactly why
that is the magic moment is not made clear. . . . [T]he Court’s defense
seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”15 The theoretical ability of
the fetus to live outside the mother’s womb turns on factors irrelevant to
the strength of the state’s interest in preserving life. Moreover, the
viability standard rests the constitutional status of the fetus on
characteristics that vary with race and gender. While the Court sometimes
employs rules that produce unintentional racial and gender disparities,
there seems no reason to constitutionalize such disparate impacts in the
absence of a principled justification.
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The Court’s inability to offer a reasoned defense of the viability standard,
the moral and constitutional irrelevance of the characteristics it measures
and the disparate racial and gender impacts that result provide reason
enough for abandoning the viability rule. Section IV offers an additional
ground for eliminating the viability standard from the Court’s abortion
jurisprudence or limiting its application. Specifically, the viability rule
interferes with the pursuit of the legitimate state interests supporting
regulation of late-term methods of abortion that even the Justices most
supportive of abortion rights describe as “gruesome.”16

I.

The Casey Joint Opinion and Its Dicta on Viability

Many observers expected the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey to
significantly erode or even end the regime of constitutional abortion rights
first recognized in Roe v. Wade.17 At the time Casey was decided, at least
five of the Justices had authored or joined opinions criticizing the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence.18 Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court’s newest
member, was not expected to be a strong supporter of abortion rights.19 It
came as somewhat of a surprise, therefore, when two Justices previously
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skeptical of Roe helped author the plurality opinion that reaffirmed “the
essential holding” of that case on stare decisis grounds.20
While reaffirming what the plurality saw as the core of Roe, the joint
opinion in Casey altered the Court’s approach to abortion rights in various
respects. The plurality explicitly abandoned Roe’s “trimester framework,”
described as “a rigid prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the
protection of fetal life.”21 On the contrary, the joint opinion recognized “a
substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy.”22 From
the outset of the pregnancy, states could “take measures to ensure that the
woman’s choice is informed,” so long as those measures were designed to
“persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion,” and did not
represent an “undue burden on the right.”23 One aspect of Roe that the
Casey plurality purported to retain, however, was the Court’s
identification of viability as the earliest point at which abortion could be
proscribed: “We conclude the line should be drawn at viability, so that
before that time the woman has a right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy.”24
The Casey plurality reviewed a number of provisions of Pennsylvania law,
striking down one and upholding the rest. The joint opinion rejected
challenges directed at Pennsylvania’s definition of medical emergencies
justifying an immediate abortion,25 its informed consent and waiting
period provisions requiring the abortionist to furnish certain information to
the woman at least 24 hours before the abortion,26 its parental consent
provision,27 and its recordkeeping and reporting requirements.28 At the
same time, the Court invalidated a provision requiring a married woman to
notify her husband in most circumstances before obtaining an abortion,
concluding that the provision created an undue burden for women with
abusive husbands.29

20

Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-46.

21

Id. at 873. The trimester framework did not constitute “part of the essential holding of
Roe.” Id.
22

Id. at 876.

23

Id. at 878.

24

Id. at 870.

25

Id. at 879-80.

26

Id. at 881-87.

27

Id. at 899-900.

28

Id. at 900-01.

29

Id. at 887-98.

5

Reflection on the Pennsylvania regulations challenged in Casey leads to
the conclusion that the plurality’s statements concerning viability were
dicta, irrelevant to the issues the Court was called upon to decide.
Comments in an opinion constitute dicta if they are “not essential to [the
Court’s] disposition of any of the issues contested” in the case.30 The
provisions of Pennsylvania law at issue in Casey applied throughout
pregnancy, governing abortions even in the very earliest stages.
Consequently, nothing in the case required the Court to determine how
late in pregnancy the right to an abortion continued. Recognition of any
right to abortion, no matter how long it persisted, would trigger the same
scrutiny of the Pennsylvania statutory provisions. The question of viability
vel non did not alter the Court’s analysis of the provisions that were
upheld, nor of the provision struck down.31
“Dictum settles nothing, even in the court that utters it.”32 Language that
constitutes dicta is not binding in subsequent litigation.33 Though an
earlier Court’s dicta “may be followed if sufficiently persuasive,” they
“are not controlling.”34 Thus, where the Court articulates a test of
constitutionality, one element of which constitutes dicta, it may
nevertheless “correct course” in a subsequent case involving application of
the test.35
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In Cohens v. Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall offered a now-classic
rationale for denying controlling weight to dicta in a prior case:
The question actually before the Court is investigated with
care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles
which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their
relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on
all other cases is seldom completely investigated.36
In other words, the distinction between holding and dicta recognizes the
limits of judicial foresight. Judges tend to be bright people, but their
decisions inevitably produce consequences in subsequent cases that they
did not fully anticipate. This is true in part because parties have little
incentive to brief issues tangential to the case under consideration. Judicial
statements regarding issues actually raised in litigation, by contrast, are
more reliable because they are more likely to be informed by extensive
adversarial briefing.37
These considerations support treating Casey’s discussion of viability as
dicta. It seems doubtful that the Justices in the Casey plurality were fully
cognizant of future cases like Stenberg when they drafted the joint
opinion. Moreover, since viability was not relevant to the constitutionality
of the challenged Pennsylvania regulations, potential justifications for the
viability rule played no more than a de minimis role in the parties’ briefs.38
This may explain why, as we will see below, Casey’s joint opinion offered
no substantive rationale for adhering to viability as the point at which
states may proscribe abortions.39 Nor, apart from a single footnote dropped
36
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by Justice Scalia, did the dissenters engage the plurality on this aspect of
the joint opinion.40 The Casey plurality’s purported reaffirmation of the
viability line presents an appropriate instance for the principle that the
Court is “not bound to follow . . . dicta in a prior case in which the
point . . . at issue was not fully debated.”41

II.

Casey’s Stare Decisis Analysis and the Viability Rule

The Casey joint opinion premised its partial reaffirmation of Roe on the
principle of stare decisis.42 In the course of its stare decisis analysis, the
Court focused on two harms it believed would flow from overruling Roe.
First, the plurality thought that many women had come to rely on a right to
abortion as the basis for significant personal decisions, and that these
reliance interests would be undermined by abandonment of the Court’s
abortion jurisprudence.43 Second, the authors of the joint opinion feared
that the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public would be adversely
affected if it overruled Roe in the face of persistent opposition.44 Both
points were strongly contested in the dissenting opinions.45 For present
purposes, however, it is enough to show that neither argument supports
continued adherence to the viability line.
The Casey plurality discussed the reliance engendered by Roe in the
following passage:
40

Justice Scalia’s principal point was that adherence to the viability standard was
inconsistent with Justice O’Connor’s previous critique of that standard as “arbitrary.” See
Casey, 505 U.S. at 989 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)). In a footnote, Justice Scalia commented as follows:
Of course, Justice O’Connor was correct in her former view. The
arbitrariness of the viability line is confirmed by the Court’s inability to
offer any justification for it beyond the conclusory assertion that it is
only at that point that the unborn child’s life “can in reason and all
fairness” be thought to override the interests of the mother. Precisely
why is it that, at the magical second when machines currently in use
(though not necessarily available to the particular woman) are able to
keep an unborn child alive apart from its mother, the creature is
suddenly able (under our Constitution) to be protected by law, whereas
before that magical second it was not? That make no more sense than
according infants legal protection only after the point when they can
feed themselves.
Id. at 989 n.5.
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[F]or two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion
in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social
life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to
control their reproductive lives.46
Assuming the validity of the plurality’s analysis here, the argument does
not support retention of viability as the terminal point for a constitutional
right to abortion. While some women may make career and relationship
decisions on the assumption that they can obtain an abortion, it would be
difficult to make the case that women have “relied reasonably on the . . .
continued application” of the viability rule.47 It is implausible that such
personal and professional decisions rest on the assumption that the
opportunity to obtain an abortion will remain available for more than five
months after pregnancy begins. Whatever reasonable reliance interests
exist in this context can be fully vindicated through an abortion right that
ends well before the point of viability. The ability of women to “control
their reproductive lives” can co-exist comfortably with a state’s insistence
that the woman exercise that control early in the process of gestation, long
before fetal viability.
As to the question of legitimacy, the joint opinion in Casey suggests that
this concern would be implicated only if the Court overruled Roe outright,
not if it merely adjusted the subsidiary rules through which the abortion
right has been administered.48 The plurality itself rejected Roe’s trimester
framework, adopting instead an undue burden test, and overruled two
post-Roe decisions that had placed excessive impediments in the way of
legitimate state regulations, all without any apparent concern for
institutional legitimacy.49 Taken as a whole, then, the joint opinion shows
46
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analysis. While there were no doubt segments of the public who saw the Court as more
legitimate because it resisted the pressure to overrule Roe, I suspect there were groups of
equal size whose respect for the Court diminished because of its unwillingness to
reconsider a decision so difficult to justify in terms of constitutional text, history and
tradition. Stubbornly clinging to a bad precedent can adversely impact the Court’s
perceived legitimacy as much as overruling under political pressure. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S.
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that the plurality’s concern for the Court’s perceived legitimacy does not
play a decisive role in stare decisis analysis so long as the Court leaves in
place a basic right to abortion derived from Roe.50
Section I argued that Casey’s discussion of viability constituted dicta on
an issue that was not raised in the case and had not been the subject of
plenary briefing.51 This section contends that reconsideration of the
constitutional significance of fetal viability would comport with the Casey
plurality’s stare decisis analysis. Rethinking the viability line would be
analogous to reexamining the trimester framework, which once included
viability as a constituent part.52 The Court should therefore feel free to
revisit the viability standard in an appropriate case. The next section will
argue that the Court has never offered an adequate explanation for the
viability rule first adopted in Roe.

III.

The Persistent Failure to Justify the Viability Rule

Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have generated much discussion of
whether a judge may appropriately take foreign law into account in
resolving questions under the United States Constitution.53 In Roper v.
416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986)).
50

In any event, there seem to me reasons to question the premise that stare decisis rules
apply the same here as in other contexts. Such a position ignores the weightiness of the
interests at stake in the abortion controversy. If anything, perhaps the Court should be
less wedded to its prior precedents when human lives may be on the line. In the context
of capital punishment, the Court has sometimes said that “death is different,” suggesting
that courts should take greater care to ensure the legality of their judgments and the
fairness of their procedures when human lives are at issue. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 605-06 (2002); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). With respect to its abortion jurisprudence, the Court has
professed agnosticism in the face of claims that the unborn fetus is a human life prior to
the point of viability. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159. Consequently, Roe and its progeny have
erected a set of constitutional rules authorizing the death of beings that, for all the Court
knows, may have a moral entitlement to continue living as great as that of any adult
human being. Given that adherence to the viability rule may result in the unjustified
deaths of thousands of human persons annually, it would seem reasonable for the Court
to show greater willingness to reexamine the premises underlying its constitutional
analysis in this context than when it is asked to revisit some decision affecting less
significant interests.
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Simmons, for instance, in concluding that the death penalty may not be
applied to a person below the age of 18 at the time of the murder, the
Court observed that only a small number of countries permit capital
sentences in those circumstances.54 In his Roper dissent, Justice Scalia
accused the Court of being selective in its invocation of foreign law,
pointing to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence as an example. The United
States, he argued, is “one of only six countries that allow abortion on
demand until the point of viability.”55 An article cited by Justice Scalia
provides additional data on abortion laws worldwide:
The vast majority of the world’s countries (187 of 195)
forbid abortion after 12 weeks gestation, and require, at a
minimum, that the pregnant woman make some showing of
“good reason” to terminate a pregnancy (141 of 195).
Indeed, half the countries of the world (98 of 195) either
forbid abortion altogether or allow abortions only to save
the woman’s life or physical health, or in cases of rape or
incest. World opinion on abortion thus appears much more
restrictive of abortion rights than domestic constitutional
law.56
Professor Mary Ann Glendon notes that “no Continental [European]
country permits abortion on demand as far into pregnancy as does the
United States.”57
54
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In highlighting these differences between U.S. abortion law and that of
other countries, I do not intend to weigh in on the debate about the Court’s
reliance on foreign law. Rather, I do so simply as a way of framing the
question addressed in this section of the article: What is the justification
for rejecting any significant regulatory constraint on taking the life of a
fetus prior to the point that the fetus could survive outside the womb? If
other nations generally conclude that abortion rights should not extend so
far into pregnancy, what explains the Supreme Court’s insistence on such
a permissive line?

A.

The Court’s “Explanations” of the Viability Line

A draft of the opinion in Roe, circulated by Justice Blackmun following
reargument of the case in 1972, would have protected abortion on demand
only until the end of the first trimester, permitting states to require a
therapeutic justification for any abortion thereafter.58 In a memorandum
accompanying that draft, Justice Blackmun made the observations quoted
at the outset of this article. He noted that selection of the end of the first
trimester as the legally relevant point “is arbitrary, but perhaps any other
selected point, such as quickening or viability, is equally arbitrary.”59
Following further internal deliberations, the majority switched to viability
as the point at which states could regulate to protect the life of the fetus,
adopting a position previously suggested by then-District Court Judge Jon
O. Newman.60
The Roe opinion discussed the significance of viability in the following
passage:

much an ‘outlier’; Western Europe, while permitting abortion, has imposed many
intermediate requirements that have been struck down in the United States.”) (citing
MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN
FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 15-24 (1987)).
58

GARROW, supra note 1, at 580-81 (“During the first three months, Blackmun’s opinion
held, a state ‘must do no more than to leave the abortion decision to the best medical
judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.’ However, ‘For the stage
subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it chooses, determine a point beyond
which it restricts legal abortions to stated reasonable therapeutic categores that are
articulated with sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to predict what conditions fall
within the stated classifications.’”); see also David Garrow, Roe v. Wade Revisited, 9
GREEN BAG 71, 79 (2005) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, ED., ET AL, WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID (2005)).
59

Cover Memorandum Accompanying Draft of Roe v. Wade, quoted in DAVID GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 580 (2005).
60

See Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 232 (D. Conn. 1972); GARROW, supra note 1,
at 580-86.
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With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest
in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This
is so because the fetus then presumably has the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. State
regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has
both logical and biological justifications.61
It was this discussion that gave rise to Professor Ely’s comment that the
Court “seems to mistake a definition for a syllogism.”62 While the word
“because” leads the reader to expect a rationale for selecting viability as
the controlling line, the remainder of the sentence disappoints that
expectation, simply rephrasing the Court’s earlier explanation of what
viability means.63 The Court alludes to “logical and biological
justifications” in the sentence that follows, but these are nowhere spelled
out in the opinion.
A standard critique of the viability rule has been that it attributes
constitutional significance to a line that can change over time, depending
on the current state of medical technology.64 Others, however, have
offered a more profound critique. While the Court has treated viability as a
tipping point, at which the state interest in protecting fetal life becomes
sufficiently compelling to outweigh the mother’s interest in ending the
pregnancy, there is no obvious sense in which the fact of fetal viability
61

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). The opinion subjected postviability abortion
restrictions to a substantial qualification: “If the State is interested in protecting fetal life
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it
is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.” Id. (emphasis added). In Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the companion case to Roe, the Court treated the idea of
maternal “health” expansively, noting that “the medical judgment may be exercised in
light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—
relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health” Id. at 192.
This broad understanding of the factors an abortion provider can take into consideration
in concluding that a third-trimester abortion will benefit the mother’s “health” has led
some to conclude that the Court’s exception effectively swallows the rule allowing states
to ban abortions after viability. See RAMESH PONNURU, PARTY OF DEATH 9-10 (2006).
62

John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 YALE L. J. 920, 924 (1973).

63

Compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (“Physicians and their scientific colleagues have
regarded [quickening] with less interest and have tended to focus either upon conception,
upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus becomes ‘viable,’ that is,
potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is
usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24
weeks.”).
64

See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 456 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Just as improvements
in medical technology inevitably will move forward the point at which the State may
regulate for reasons of maternal health, different technological improvements will move
backward the point of viability at which the State may proscribe abortions except when
necessary to preserve the life and health of the mother.”).
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causes the state’s interest in the life of the unborn to weigh more than it
did before.65
The Casey plurality had an opportunity to supply Roe’s omitted
justification for the viability standard, but the joint opinion did not rise to
the challenge. The plurality offered two reasons for retaining the viability
rule. The first was the principle of stare decisis. The plurality noted that
“[a]ny judicial act of line-drawing may seem somewhat arbitrary, but Roe
was a reasoned statement, elaborated with great care.”66 This description
of Roe completely overlooked Professor Ely’s still unanswered critique.
Whatever the merits of Roe in other respects, its adoption of viability as
the controlling line was not “a reasoned statement, elaborated with great
care.”
The second rationale offered by the Casey joint opinion effectively
compounded the problem, succumbing to the same definition/syllogism
confusion that afflicted the opinion in Roe:
[T]he concept of viability, as we noted in Roe, is the time at
which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent
existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be
the object of state protection that now overrides the rights
of the woman. Consistent with other constitutional norms,
legislatures may draw lines which appear arbitrary without
the necessity of offering a justification. But courts may not.
We must justify the lines we draw. And there is no line
other than viability which is more workable.67
While acknowledging the Court’s obligation to justify the viability line,
the plurality failed to do so. References to “reason” and “fairness” are just
rhetorical flourishes in the absence of a principled explanation of why the
“possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb”
changes the strength of the state interest in a way that causes it to
outweigh the interest of the mother. The conclusion that no other line “is
more workable” does nothing to show that the viability line satisfies the
call for principled justification.
65

See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting); Mark J. Beutler, Comment,
Abortion and the Viability Standard—Toward a More Reasoned Determination of the
State’s Countervailing Interest in Protecting Prenatal Life, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 347,
360 (1991) (“The point of viability says much about medical technology, little about
fetuses, and has no apparent logical connection to the two interests which compete in the
abortion equation—the woman’s autonomy interest and the intrinsic worth of the fetus.”).
66

Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.

67

Id. (citation omitted).
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The real problem, in my view, is that Justice Blackmun was correct in his
initial assessment, when he candidly conceded the possibility that it would
be “equally arbitrary” to terminate the abortion right at the end of the first
trimester or at viability.68 Justice White challenged the justification for the
viability standard in a subsequent dissent, arguing that “the Court’s choice
of viability as the point at which the State’s interest becomes compelling is
entirely arbitrary.”69 The subsections that follow consider and reject three
possible explanations for the viability standard, drawn from Roe, Casey
and Judge Newman’s opinion first suggesting the viability standard. The
inadequacy of these three rationales shows that the Supreme Court has
failed to offer a principled defense of viability as the controlling line.

B.

Dependent Beings as Unworthy of Protection

The point of viability marks a theoretical transition from dependence to
autonomy.70 Before viability, the fetus cannot survive without the support
of the mother. After viability, the fetus potentially can survive apart from
the mother, at least with appropriate technological assistance. Thus, after
viability, the fetus can be described as possessing a form of autonomy or
independence it did not possess beforehand.71 So long as the fetus remains
in the mother’s womb, of course, this autonomy is hypothetical, rather
than actual.72 The conclusion that a fetus is viable is not a description of
an existing state of affairs, so much as a medical prediction of what might
happen in circumstances that do not then exist.73
The Roe Court concluded that the form of theoretical autonomy denoted
by the term “viability” plays a decisive role in transforming the character
of a state’s interest in preserving the life of the unborn. At this point, Roe
indicated, the state’s interest in what the Court called “potential life”
68

See supra text accompanying note 59.

69

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
794 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
70

Donald Hope, The Hand as Emblem of Human Identity: A Solution to the Abortion
Controversy Based on Science and Reason, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 205, 212 (2001) (“[A]s
long as the fetus is dependent and vulnerable, it can be destroyed and only earns the right
to legal protection when it passes the point of a hypothetical independence.”).
71

Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (viability “is the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb, so that the independent existence of
the second life” can receive state protection) (emphasis added).
72

Hope, supra note 70, at 208 (“The viability standard stands for the curious notion that
all those who need the life support of gestation may be terminated at will, while for those
who can survive without gestation, gestation can be mandated.”).

73
Id. at 211 (“Viability is a prediction about survivability, based on assessment of fetal
lung maturity. As such, it must be estimated from other developmental features and is not
directly observable.”).
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suddenly becomes strong enough to count as “compelling.”74 The
implication is that some significant change occurs in the fetus at the time
when ex utero survival becomes possible, a change that suddenly shifts the
balance in the state’s favor.
In a dissenting opinion authored thirteen years after Roe, Justice White
questioned the justification for the viability standard, offering a critique
that the Court has not successfully answered to this day. Justice White
began with facts about fetal development that cannot reasonably be
denied: “the fetus is an entity that bears in its cells all the genetic
information that characterizes a member of the species homo sapiens and
distinguishes an individual member of that species from all others.”75 He
could see no morally or constitutionally significant change in the fetus at
viability that would affect the strength of the relevant state interest:
The governmental interest at issue is in protecting those
who will be citizens if their lives are not ended in the
womb. The substantiality of this interest is in no way
dependent on the probability that the fetus may be capable
of surviving outside the womb at any given point in its
development, as the possibility of survival is contingent on
the state of medical practice and technology, factors that
are in essence morally and constitutionally irrelevant. The
State’s interest is in the fetus as an entity in itself, and the
character of this entity does not change at the point of
viability under conventional medical wisdom. Accordingly,
the State’s interest, if compelling after viability, is equally
compelling before viability.76
To answer Justice White’s argument and satisfy its obligation of reasoned
decisionmaking, the Court must show that the conditions leading to a
finding of viability bear in some significant respect, legally or morally, on
the strength of the state’s interest in unborn life.
The Court could try to meet Justice White’s challenge by reference to
some legal or philosophical understanding of personhood. One might
argue that the theoretical autonomy associated with viability serves as a
trigger point—a sort of moral on-off switch—changing what was
74

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. The phrase “potential life” is a euphemism. No one really denies
that the unborn human is alive as a biological matter before an abortion. See PONNURU,
supra note 61, at 78 (an embryo “is alive rather than dead or inanimate. It is human rather
than a member of some other species.”). The question is the strength of the state’s interest
in preserving the actual life of the fetus, not its “potential” life.
75

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).

76

Id. at 795.
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previously just a developing mass of cells into a “person” or “human life”
entitled to government protection. Professor Michael Anthony Lewis
appears to embrace such an argument in an article discussing “freedom of
autonomy,” a concept he deems morally fundamental: “For freedom of
autonomy purposes the fetus is a person at the point of viability, and the
state is justified in prohibiting abortion to protect that person’s right to be
left alone to live, subject to the usual exceptions for mother’s health and
other extenuating circumstances.”77
A claim of this sort about viability, however, seems impossible to
reconcile with an earlier portion of the Roe opinion. The Court denied that
judges have the capacity to determine the point at which “life” begins
from a moral standpoint:
Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment,
life begins at conception and is present throughout
pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling
interest in protecting that life from and after conception.
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life
begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the
development of man’s knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.78
The Court displays a commendable humility in this passage. The members
of the Supreme Court are generalists. They possess no particular expertise
in addressing moral questions such as those that underlie a case like Roe.
In addition to taking the Court beyond its competence, denying that a
previable fetus counts as a human life would also create tension with the
Casey Court’s recognition of a legitimate state interest in preserving the
life of the fetus from the beginning of pregnancy. The plurality
acknowledged “that the State has [a] legitimate interest[] from the outset
of the pregnancy in protecting . . . the life of the fetus,” albeit an interest
that before viability is “not strong enough to support a prohibition of
77

Michael Anthony Lewis, Reviving a Natural Right: The Freedom of Autonomy, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 159 (2006). Note that the term “person” is used in different
senses, depending on context. The Roe Court denied that a fetus constitutes a “person” as
that term is used in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Framers, in the Court’s view, used
the term “person” to refer to those who had already been born. In Professor Lewis’
argument, by contrast, the term “person” denotes a moral category, not a constitutional
one. Even if the Framers for constitutional purposes used the term “person” to refer to
postnatal humans, that does not foreclose the possibility that some or all prenatal humans
might be “persons” for moral purposes.
78

Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
effective right to elect the procedure.”79
While the Court cannot take up the argument that viability represents the
sine qua non of human personhood, perhaps it could offer a somewhat
different moral argument. One might view the moral entitlement of the
fetus as something that increases over time as a consequence of various
capacities that emerge in the process of fetal development. This would be
consistent with the Court’s statement in Roe that the state’s legitimate
interest in fetal life “grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term
and, at a point during pregnancy, . . . becomes ‘compelling.’”80 It would
also be consistent with the Casey plurality’s recognition of a state interest
in fetal life that comes into existence at the beginning of pregnancy, but
only becomes sufficiently powerful to warrant a prohibition of abortion
after viability. In this framework, the theoretical autonomy denoted by the
term “viability” is a morally significant fact about the fetus—not the only
morally significant fact, perhaps, but one without which the fetus lacks an
entitlement to life that the state can protect. Thus, the authors of the Casey
joint opinion contended that the “realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb” after viability corresponds to “the
independent existence of [a] second life” that “can in reason and all
fairness be the object of state protection that now overrides the rights of
the woman.”81
While one can more easily reconcile this sliding scale theory of fetal
entitlement with the language of Roe and Casey, it is not clear why the
contested moral questions in this context would be any less difficult than
the question of “when life begins,” which the Roe Court thought itself
incapable of resolving.82 The theory that moral entitlements are connected
to our emerging capacities presents a highly controversial claim as a
philosophical matter.83 And even if the theory enjoyed broad support at
some high level of generality, one nevertheless suspects that “those trained
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology” would
reach divergent conclusions regarding the moral weight that should attach
to the emergence of any particular capacity.84
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.

80

Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.

81

Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.

82

Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.

83

See, e.g., PONNURU, supra note 61, at 127, 175-79; Robert P. George, Terri Schiavo: A
Right to Life Denied or a Right to Die Honored?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 419, 419-22
(2006).
84

Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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More particularly, the Court needs to show that the moral entitlement of
the fetus (and hence the state interest in protecting the fetus) becomes
significantly stronger once the fetus crosses the threshold of viability. But
here the Court must deal with Justice White’s contention that the viability
of a particular fetus turns on “factors that are in essence morally and
constitutionally irrelevant.”85 There is no difference in kind between the
pre-viable and post-viable fetus, merely a difference in the degree of
development. While the fetus can be said to possess (at least theoretically)
a new form of autonomy or independence at viability, it is not clear why
this attribute carries the decisive moral weight attributed to it by the Court.
The law does not generally require autonomy or independence as a
condition for the existence of enforceable legal rights and interests. In
many contexts, we deem physical dependence compatible with legal
independence. In cases concerning medical treatment, for instance, our
laws often recognize comatose or otherwise incompetent patients as
continuing to possess rights or interests that may be asserted in litigation
and protected by the state.86 As Justice Kennedy noted in Stenberg, a state
is properly concerned with “the dignity and value of human life, even life
which cannot survive without the assistance of others.”87
In some contexts, indeed, it is the very fact of dependence—the absence of
autonomy—that brings legal rights into existence. The prisoner or
institutionalized person has claims against the state that could not be
asserted if the individual could provide for himself; it is only his
dependence that gives him a cause of action.88 A young child has a right to
support and maintenance from her parents precisely because the law

85

Id. at 795.

86

See, e.g., David M. English, The Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act and Its Progress
in the States, PROBATE AND PROPERTY 19 (May/June 2001) (“Most states recognize
living wills, powers of attorneys for health care and a decision making role for the
families of those who have failed to make advance directives.”); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
87

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 962 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

88

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (“An inmate must rely on prison
authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not
be met.”); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199200 (1989) (“when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against
his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 317 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized—and wholly dependent on the
State—it is conceded by petitioners that a duty to provide certain services and care does
exist, although even then a State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining
the nature and scope of its responsibilities.”).
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recognizes her dependence on them as an attribute calling for state
protection.89
Even if we deemed some form of autonomy relevant to the status of the
fetus, however, the Court has nowhere explained why the particular form
associated with viability is legally or morally controlling. “Autonomy” or
“independence” is not a single, unvariable condition. It is a continuum, a
matter of degree. We all depend on others for the fulfillment of various
needs. Every time we walk into a grocery store, check into a hospital, fill a
prescription, or call the electric company to report an interruption of
service, we implicitly recognize various forms of dependence on others,
some of which may be critical to survival.
An important form of autonomy comes into existence very early in
development, with the creation of an embryo genetically independent of
its mother.90 A different form of autonomy commences when the heartbeat
begins, another when the embryo becomes a fetus with a functioning brain
and the capacity for independent movement,91 another at the point of birth,
another when the child can walk, another when it can fix its own meals
and still another when it gets a driver’s license. The autonomy associated
with the medical concept of viability seems less significant, as a practical
matter, than many of these other forms because it is merely theoretical.92
Viability is just a probability, a prediction of what doctors think could

89

See 67A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, Parent and Child § 156 (2006) (“The duty of
parents to provide necessary support and maintenance may be said to rest on the inability
of children to care for themselves. . . .”); Liability of Parent for Necessaries Furnished to
Adult Child, 42 A.L.R. 150 (1926) (“The general rules of the law of parent and child,
being based on the child's incapacity, both natural and legal, and its consequent need of
protection and care, apply only while the child is under the age of majority, and the
father's legal duty to support his child ceases when the child comes of age, although it
continues to reside in his family.”).
90

Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 792 (White, J., dissenting).
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About eight weeks after conception, at the transition from embryo to fetus, “the brain
first begins to show electrical activity that is measurable by EEG.” Hope, supra note 70,
at 216. “It is at this stage of development that movement, first reflexive and then
spontaneous, appears.” Id. at 217.
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Here lies the problem with the Casey plurality’s description of viability as the point
when “the independent existence of the second life can in reason and all fairness be the
object of state protection that now overrides the rights of the woman.” Casey, 505 U.S. at
870. The Court cannot mean that there was no “independent existence” of a “second life”
before the point of viability. It is indisputable that there was a second life before viability
that was independent genetically, that had its own heartbeat and brainwaves and that
could move independently of the mother. The Court does nothing to enlighten us as to
why it believes that only the emergence of the particular form of independence associated
with viability tips the balance in favor of the state.
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happen under a set of conditions different than those that in fact exist.93 It
brings about no real alteration in the life of either the fetus or the mother.94
Justice White found viability “morally and constitutionally irrelevant”
because it “is contingent on the state of medical practice and
technology.”95 As a consequence of this technological dependence, the
constitutional status of a fetus can depend on the year in which it was
conceived, rather than any characteristic of the fetus itself. The Casey
plurality was untroubled by the question “whether viability occurs at
approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24
weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly
earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal respiratory capacity can somehow
be enhanced in the future.”96 But the result of this malleable standard is
that a state in 1973 probably lacked authority to protect, say, a 26-weekold fetus, while the very same fetus could be afforded legal protection
today. By the same token, it seems a logical consequence of the Court’s
reasoning that fetuses in rural areas enjoy less potential for legal
protection than those in cities with state-of-the-art neonatal facilities.97
The long-noted moral randomness of the viability standard ultimately
shades into moral perversity. The medical evidence shows that viability
tends to occur at different points in development, depending on the race,
ethnicity and gender of the fetus.98 A recently published study of
extremely low birth weight (ELBW) infants, for instance, shows
significantly greater prospects for survival among female and AfricanAmerican fetuses:
Female survival rates were higher than male survival rates
in all 3 gestational age curves and across the entire range of
birth weights. Black survival rates were always higher than
white survival rates. In addition, the effect of female gender
on survival rates seemed larger than the effect of black
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See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 (White, J., dissenting).
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 860; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (viability “is usually placed at
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks”).
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See Hope, supra note 70, at 211 (“Viability actually becomes a vague marker if we ask
whether we mean viability in an advanced neonatal ICU or viability in a remote rural
county with limited medical resources.”).
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Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Neonatal Mortality—United States, 1989-2001, 292
J. AMER. MED. ASS’N 2461 (2004); Greg R. Alexander et al., US Birth
Weight/Gestational Age-Specific Neonatal Mortality: 1995-1997 Rates for Whites,
Hispanics, and Blacks, 111 PEDIATRICS 61 (2003).

21

race. Both race and gender effects became more distinct at
lower weights and gestational ages.99
The Supreme Court, in other words, has constitutionalized a standard with
disparate impacts based on race and gender. As a corollary, since it takes
longer for a white fetus to reach viability, the right to an abortion under
the Roe/Casey framework tends to last longer for white women than for
African-Americans.
I certainly do not believe the Supreme Court was aware of these racial and
gender disparities when it adopted the viability standard. But I do believe
these disparate impacts underscore the Court’s obligation to either justify
or abandon the viability rule. When faced with a practice that produces
disparate impacts for a protected class, a common judicial response has
been to examine the adequacy of the reasons offered for the practice in
question.100 We sometimes tolerate racial and gender disparities when they
are the unintentional consequence of a rule justified on other grounds, but
there is no reason for tolerance when the rule itself lacks a principled
justification.
Neither Roe nor the cases that followed have offered a theory of human
rights or fetal entitlements that would explain the decisive role attributed
to viability in the context of abortion regulation. Such a theory seems an
indispensable element for the Court to satisfy its admitted obligation to
“justify the lines we draw.”101 For the sake of completeness, however, we
will consider below two other judicial arguments in support of the
viability standard that are not necessarily premised on the idea that a
morally or constitutionally significant change occurs in the fetus as it
crosses the viability threshold.

C.

Presumed Societal Consensus at Viability

The idea of treating viability as the controlling constitutional line did not
originate with the Supreme Court in Roe. The Court borrowed the concept
from dicta in Judge Newman’s opinion for the majority of a three-judge
district court in Abele v. Markle, which struck down Connecticut’s
abortion law a few months before Roe was released.102 Judge Newman’s
99

Steven B. Morse et al., Racial and Gender Differences in the Viability of Extremely
Low Birth Weight Infants: A Population-Based Study, 117 PEDIATRICS 106, 110 (2006).
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See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, (discussing disparate impact claims
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cannot be justified by business necessity") (quoting International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)); United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717, 735-36 (1992) (questioning educational justifications for admissions policies
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argument for the viability standard proceeded in two steps, both of which
are highly contestable.
Judge Newman began by suggesting that a high level of societal consensus
must exist before a state interest can count as “compelling”:
The state interest advanced by this statute is critically
different in nature than state interests that have been
claimed, in other cases, to be sufficiently compelling to
justify impairment of constitutional rights. A compelling
state interest has generally been one where the nature of the
interest was broadly accepted, with dispute remaining only
as to whether the state could constitutionally advance that
interest by the specific means being challenged. When
Americans of Japanese descent were placed in relocation
camps as a protection in the event of invasion, it was
widely accepted that there was an important governmental
interest in military security, even though it was a matter of
sharp dispute whether that interest could justify an
abridgement of constitutional rights based on a racial
classification.103
Judge Clarie’s dissent rejected the notion that societal consensus is
necessary for a state interest to count as compelling: “diversity of
viewpoint does not diminish state interest but often intensifies it. It is
precisely for this reason that the weighing of conflicting values and
viewpoints is a legislative, not a judicial, task.”104
Even granting Judge Newman’s consensus test for the sake of argument,
one can still maintain that Connecticut demonstrated a compelling state
interest in support of its abortion law. Judge Newman’s principle called
for societal consensus only at a high level of generality. In discussing the
Japanese internment case, for instance, he recognized a broad consensus as
to the general goal of “military security,” notwithstanding a vigorous
debate over the “specific means” of placing Japanese-Americans in
relocation camps. If the regulation at issue in Korematsu satisfies Judge
Newman’s consensus test, then abortion regulations would seem to follow
rather easily. No one would question the existence of a broad societal
consensus in favor of state protection for innocent human life. The debate
concerns only whether the state should pursue that interest through the
“specific means” of regulating abortions.
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Id. at 15-16 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
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Id. at 33 (Clarie, J., dissenting).
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In any event, Judge Newman’s consensus requirement seems difficult to
reconcile with a case like Grutter v. Bollinger, which concerned
affirmative action in law school admissions.105 In upholding the
affirmative action program in that case, the Court accepted the state’s
argument that it has a compelling interest in maintaining diversity in the
law school’s student body.106 Clearly, this was a highly controversial
proposition before the case was decided.107 Large segments of the public
would deny that the government has any legitimate interest in maintaining
diversity, much less that this interest counts as compelling.
The second step in Judge Newman’s analysis was to suggest that a societal
consensus in favor of protecting fetal life might not emerge until viability:
Like the present statute, [a statute designed to prevent the
destruction of fetuses after viability has been reached]
would be conferring statutory rights on a fetus which does
not have constitutional rights. However, the state interest in
protecting the life of a fetus capable of living outside the
uterus could be shown to be more generally accepted and,
therefore, of more weight in the constitutional sense than
the interest in preventing the abortion of a fetus that is not
viable.108
Judge Newman did not really claim—and certainly made no attempt to
document—the proposition that a consensus in favor of protecting fetal
life would form only at the point of viability. This is not surprising, given
that this portion of the opinion was dicta, irrelevant to consideration of the
Connecticut abortion statute before the court. In the absence of evidentiary
support, however, Judge Newman’s suggestion of viability as the legally
significant line represents little more than a judicial hunch, a guess about
what Americans might think from someone with little basis to know.
Unlike legislators, who have a stake in discerning the views of their
constituents, we purposely shelter federal judges from the influence of
public opinion.109
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In applying its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
thought the best evidence of public consensus was provided by state
legislative enactments. Thus, the Court has examined the laws of the states
to discern whether a national consensus exists as to the propriety of
executing certain categories of capital defendants.110 By that measure,
Judge Newman’s hunch about the American consensus on fetal life seems
clearly inaccurate. Employing viability as the controlling standard, the
Supreme Court’s opinions in Roe and its companion case resulted in the
invalidation of the abortion laws of nearly every state in the union.111
Using the test employed in the capital punishment context, then, the preRoe consensus favored protection of fetal life at a point prior to
viability.112 Moreover, if one looks to international consensus, as the
Supreme Court has sometimes done under the Eighth Amendment, it is
telling that only a handful of countries permit abortion as late in pregnancy
as viability.113 The viability standard was so aberrant at the time of Roe,
and remains so aberrant by international standards today, that, were it a
rule governing executions, it would be in danger of invalidation as “cruel
and unusual punishment” under the Court’s Eighth Amendment case law.

D.

The Woman’s Presumed Consent at Viability

The joint opinion in Casey offered one other argument in favor of viability
as the point at which states may seek to protect the life of the fetus. The
plurality argued that the viability line has “an element of fairness,”
because “[i]n some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to
act before viability has consented to the State’s intervention on behalf of
the developing child.”114 This dovetails with an argument made by Judge
Newman in Abele, who wrote that a statute banning abortion after viability
“would not be a direct abridgement of the woman’s constitutional right,
but at most a limitation on the time when her right could be exercised.”115
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These arguments explain why a constitutional right to abortion should not
extend farther than the point of viability. The Casey plurality recognized
that when someone makes a decision as consequential as the decision to
terminate a pregnancy, states have a legitimate interest in structuring the
decisionmaking process to express respect for the life of the unborn.116
States can adopt informed consent provisions, ensuring that the woman
has been provided information relevant to the decision.117 They can also
adopt waiting periods to promote careful consideration.118 By the same
token, states have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the decision to
terminate a pregnancy be made in a timely fashion.
However, while the arguments in Casey and Abele show why a right to
abortion should not extend farther than viability, they offer no explanation
for extending the abortion right to such a late point in pregnancy. It could
just as easily be said that a woman implicitly “consent[s] to state
intervention on behalf of the developing child” if she fails to act within
some shorter period that affords an opportunity to learn of the pregnancy.
This too would be “at most a limitation on the time when her right could
be exercised.” Thus, the argument from implied consent fails as a
principled justification for selection of viability as the controlling legal
standard.

IV.

Viability and Legitimate State Interests

When the Supreme Court in Roe established a constitutional right to an
abortion that extends to the point of fetal viability, it erected what remains
one of the most permissive regimes of abortion on demand in the entire
world.119 Just how permissive became apparent when the Supreme Court
released Stenberg v. Carhart, a case that gave many people their first
glimpse into the disturbing world of late-term abortions. Justice Kennedy,
a member of the Casey plurality, dissented in Stenberg, believing Casey
had done more to rein in the excesses of Roe and its progeny than the
majority was willing to acknowledge.120 This article contends that, even if
one believes in a constitutional right to an abortion, one need not support
the extreme version of that right found in decisions like Stenberg. The
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Court could instead protect a right to abortion only in the “early stages” of
pregnancy, as the Casey plurality suggested it was doing.121
In my view, the arbitrariness of the viability standard provides a sufficient
reason for its abandonment. In the subsections that follow, however,
I offer additional grounds for ignoring Casey’s dicta about viability and
instead reading the decision to permit state regulation of late-term
abortions. Subsection A will discuss several of the opinions in Stenberg,
including Justice Kennedy’s somewhat graphic descriptions of late-term
abortion procedures. Subsection B will argue that the Court should discard
viability as the earliest point at which states can regulate to protect the life
of the unborn. Alternatively, I will argue that the viability standard should
be limited to the state interest in fetal life, and should not apply when the
state regulates to promote the distinct state interests identified in Justice
Kennedy’s Stenberg dissent, including interests in erecting a barrier
against infanticide and maintaining public respect for the medical
profession.

A.

Stenberg v. Carhart and Late-Term Abortions

In Stenberg v. Carhart, a narrow 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court struck
down Nebraska’s ban on partial birth abortions, also known as dilation and
extraction (D&X) abortions. The Court offered two reasons for the
decision. First, rejecting evidence that the D&X procedure is never
medically indicated, the majority found the ban on D&X abortions
impermissible because it failed to include an exception for the “health” of
the mother.122 Second, the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the
construction of the statute by Nebraska’s attorney general, the legislation
could be read to also prohibit a different procedure, the dilation and
evacuation (D&E) abortion, which is more commonly used to terminate
second trimester pregnancies.123
Some of the more intriguing opinions in Stenberg were the concurrences
and dissents. Of particular interest was Justice Kennedy’s dissenting
opinion, given that he was a member of the plurality that reaffirmed a
constitutional right to abortion in Casey. Justice Kennedy concluded that
the majority had failed to properly apply Casey in invalidating the
Nebraska statute.124
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Reviewing the trial transcript, Justice Kennedy described the two abortion
methods at issue in the case. He began with the D&E abortion, which
Nebraska claimed it was not seeking to ban:
As described by Dr. Carhart, the D&E procedure requires
the abortionist to use instruments to grasp a portion (such
as a foot or hand) of a developed and living fetus and drag
the grasped portion out of the uterus into the vagina. Dr.
Carhart uses the traction created by the opening between
the uterus and vagina to dismember the fetus, tearing the
grasped portion away from the remainder of the body. . . .
The fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or child
would: It bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb. The
fetus can be alive at the beginning of the dismemberment
process and can survive for a time while its limbs are being
torn off. . . . . Dr. Carhart has observed fetal heartbeat via
ultrasound with “extensive parts of the fetus removed,” and
testified that mere dismemberment of a limb does not
always cause death because he knows of a physician who
removed the arm of a fetus only to have the fetus go on to
be born “as a living child with one arm.” At the conclusion
of a D&E abortion no intact fetus remains. In Dr. Carhart’s
words, the abortionist is left with “a tray full of pieces.”125
The second form of abortion at issue in Stenberg, the D&X procedure, was
the one Nebraska claimed to prohibit by its statute:
The other procedure implicated today is called “partial birth
abortion” or the D&X. . . . In the D&X, the abortionist
initiates the woman’s natural delivery process by causing
the cervix of the woman to be dilated, sometimes over a
sequence of days. The fetus’ arms and legs are delivered
outside the uterus while the fetus is alive; witnesses to the
procedure report seeing the body of the fetus moving
outside the woman’s body. At this point, the abortion
procedure has the appearance of a live birth. . . . With only
the head of the fetus remaining in utero, the abortionist
tears open the skull. According to Dr. Martin Haskell, a
leading proponent of the procedure, the appropriate
instrument to be used at this stage of the abortion is a pair
misunderstanding of Casey, the Court holds the ban on the D & X procedure fails
because it does not include an exception permitting an abortionist to perform a D & X
whenever he believes it will best preserve the health of the woman.”).
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of scissors. Witnesses report observing the portion of the
fetus outside the woman react to the skull penetration. The
abortionist then inserts a suction tube and vacuums out the
developing brain and other matter found within the
skull. . . . Brain death does not occur until after the skull
invasion, and, according to Dr. Carhart, the heart of the
fetus may continue to beat for minutes after the contents of
the skull are vacuumed out. The abortionist next completes
the delivery of a dead fetus, intact except for the damage to
the head and the missing contents of the skull.126
Justice Kennedy recognized that both procedures would be objectionable
to those who recognize the humanity of the fetus.127 Nevertheless, he
contended that “D&X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means
Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of
disrespect for life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and
society, which depend for their sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of
dignity and respect.”128
Explicitly rejecting the distinction Justice Kennedy and the other
dissenters found between the two methods of late-term abortion, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg could see no valid reason to ban one and not the
other. According to Justice Stevens:
Although much ink is spilled today describing the
gruesome nature of late-term abortion procedures, that
rhetoric does not provide me a reason to believe that the
procedure Nebraska here claims it seeks to ban is more
brutal, more gruesome, or less respectful of ‘potential life’
than the equally gruesome procedure Nebraska claims it
still allows.129
Justice Ginsburg agreed: “[A]s Justice Stevens points out, the most
common method of performing previability second trimester abortions is
no less distressing or susceptible to gruesome description.”130 The position
of Justices Stevens and Ginsburg effectively puts states disturbed by
partial birth abortions into a sort of Catch 22. An attempt to ban both
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D&X and D&E abortions at any point prior to viability would run afoul of
Roe’s insistence that the right to abortion continues until the fetus is
viable. On the other hand, an attempt to ban just one procedure, and leave
the other in place, would be invalid because both are equally repulsive.

B.

Viability and Late-Term Abortion Regulations

I have no strong opinion as to whether one can sensibly distinguish
between D&E and D&X abortions. As I see it, Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg were right to describe both procedures as “gruesome.”131
However, the conclusion I draw from that observation differs from theirs.
In my view, the fact that it is difficult to read about late-term methods of
abortion without a shudder shows that the Supreme Court was wrong to
conclude that the Constitution protects a right to abortion extending to the
point of viability. If the Court is going to recognize a constitutional right
to abortion, the states should at least have authority to ask that the decision
be made early in pregnancy, before D&E and D&X become the only
available options. To my mind, this provides an additional reason for the
Court to discard the viability standard, just as it threw out the equally
arbitrary trimester framework in Casey.132
Alternatively, the Court should limit application of the viability standard
to the context in which it was developed. The Court in Roe recognized
only two state interests that might justify regulation of abortion—
preserving the health of the mother and protecting the life of the fetus.133
The Court adopted the viability rule as a limitation on the latter interest,
which the State of Texas had sought to protect from the point of
conception onward.134 Justice Kennedy in Stenberg advocated a broader
recognition of permissible state interests, finding it “inappropriate for the
Judicial Branch to provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated
by abortion.”135 He thought Casey “premised on the States having an
important constitutional role in defining their interests in the abortion
debate.”136
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Nebraska asserted that its ban on partial birth abortion was supported by a
state interest in “erecting a barrier to infanticide.”137 Justice Kennedy
described this interest in the following terms:
States also have an interest in forbidding medical
procedures which, in the State’s reasonable determination,
might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to
become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life
in the human fetus.138
He also thought Nebraska asserted a legitimate interest in “preserving the
integrity of the medical profession”139:
A State may take measures to ensure the medical
profession and its members are viewed as healers, sustained
by a compassionate and rigorous ethic and cognizant of the
dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot
survive without the assistance of others.140
In Justice Kennedy’s view, these interests supported Nebraska’s ban on
D&X abortions.141 But those same state interests would also support
regulation of D&E abortions. Whether or not one may rationally
distinguish between the procedures, both have the capacity to desensitize
people to the taking of human life and to undermine public confidence in
the medical profession.
Fetal viability bears only a tangential relationship to the strength of these
distinct state interests, which concern the impact of certain abortion
procedures on attitudes held by the public and by medical personnel.
Undoubtedly, some people believe that a fetus becomes a human being
only at the point of viability or afterwards. Abortion of pre-viable fetuses
may have no impact on views held by such people regarding the value of
human life or their respect for members of the medical profession. But as
the Court has recognized, much of the public believes a fetus is a human
being well before the point of viability.142 The widespread availability of
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sonograms, through which millions of people see pre-viable fetuses with
heads, eyes, fingers and other features characteristic of adult humans, will
no doubt contribute to this phenomenon.143
For someone who recognizes humanity in the fetus, knowledge that tens of
thousands of pre-viable fetuses are destroyed by D&E and D&X abortions
could lead to a loss of confidence in the medical profession which carries
out these procedures. Alternatively, since the law is a teacher, some who
see the pre-viable fetus as human (including some doctors and nurses)
may become gradually more accepting of the destruction of innocent
humans as an unpleasant but “necessary” evil. The viability standard was
developed to measure the strength of a different state interest, the interest
in preserving the lives of individual fetuses subject to abortion. It should
not be applied as a barrier to the pursuit of the legitimate state interests in
dealing with the adverse societal impacts of late-term abortions.

V.

Conclusion

At the outset of the article, I quoted the acknowledgement by the Casey
plurality of an obligation to “justify the lines we draw.”144 The corollary
would seem to be an obligation to eschew lines that defy principled
justification. In the decades since Roe, the Court has offered no adequate
rationale for the viability standard, notwithstanding persistent judicial and
academic critiques. Exacerbating this country’s divisions over abortion
and placing us out of step with the world community, the viability rule
seems a strong candidate for abandonment as the Court continues to
rethink its abortion jurisprudence in the aftermath of Casey.
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